



Britain's Brexit hopes, fears and expectations

by John Curtice, Muslihah Albakri, Allison Dunatchik and Neil Smith

This report looks at the results of questions on attitudes to Brexit that were included on the 2017 British Social Attitudes survey. It focuses on the long-term consequences of Brexit, and pays special attention to the views of people on low-incomes.

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This report analyses the results of questions on attitudes to Brexit that were included on the 2017 British Social Attitudes survey. It focuses on what voters thought the long-term consequences of Brexit will be, what it will mean for those on low incomes in particular, and on the resonance of the claim that Brexit would enable Britain to 'take back control'. It pays special attention to the views of those on a low income themselves.

What you need to know

- Voters were evenly divided between those who thought the economy would be better in 10 years' time as a result of Brexit and those who thought it would be worse, though more thought that unemployment would increase than believed it would fall.
- More thought that the number of people on a low income would increase as a result of Brexit than thought it would fall. Voters were also more likely to feel that life would become harder for people on low incomes than anticipated that it would be easier.
- The views about Brexit of those on low incomes were largely similar to those of voters in general, except that they were more likely to feel that it would result in Britain having more control over unemployment and the NHS.

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Executive summary

Relatively little research has been done on voters' perceptions of the long-term consequences of Brexit or what it is perceived to mean for those on low incomes. Additionally, little attempt has been made since the EU referendum to assess the resonance of the claim that Brexit would enable Britain 'to take back control'. Using data collected as part of the 2017 British Social Attitudes survey, and examining in particular the views of those on low incomes, this report focuses on where the public stood on these three aspects of the Brexit debate.

Almost as many voters thought the economy would be better off in 10 years' time as thought it would be worse off, though they appeared to be more optimistic about the long-term implications of Brexit than they were about its more immediate consequences. Although more people thought that unemployment would increase in the wake of Brexit than believed it would fall, a majority anticipated that Brexit would leave Britain with more control over its economy.

Approximately one in two voters thought that immigration would fall as a result of Brexit, while just over half would like to see immigration reduced post-Brexit. However, this is not as high a priority for voters as improving public services, which was named by nearly eight in 10 as one of their top three priorities after Brexit.

More voters thought that over the long term the number of people on a low income would increase as a result of leaving the EU than believed it would fall. Equally, more felt that the lives of people on a low income would be harder post-Brexit than believed they would be easier. However, the most common perception was that Brexit would not make much difference either way to the position of those on a low income.

Voters were evenly divided over whether the NHS would be better or worse following Brexit, while most thought that leaving the EU would make little difference to Britain's ability to control the performance of the NHS.

Leave voters were more optimistic than Remain supporters about the consequences of Brexit. This is especially true of whether the economy would be better or worse off. The two groups of voters disagreed much less about whether immigration would fall or not, but they disagreed markedly about whether they would like it to be reduced.

Around half of Remain voters thought that Brexit would make life for those on a low income harder and approaching half believed it would result in an increase in the number of people on a low income. In contrast, only around a third of Leave supporters took the opposite view.

The differences between Remain and Leave voters in respect of the implications of Brexit for the economy and the desirability of reducing immigration are replicated in differences by age and by educational background. Younger voters and graduates were relatively pessimistic about the economic consequences of Brexit and less likely to back a reduction in immigration. Older voters and those with relatively few, if any, educational qualifications were inclined to the opposite view. Younger people and graduates were also more pessimistic about the implications of Brexit for those on a low income, though the differences are only modest.

The balance of opinion among those on low incomes was for the most part very similar to that among voters in general. The only differences are that those on a low income were somewhat more likely to think that Brexit would result in Britain having more control over the NHS and over the level of unemployment.

The differences in views by age and education among voters as a whole were largely mirrored by low-income voters themselves. However, less well educationally qualified low-income voters were somewhat less optimistic about the economic consequences of Brexit and less likely to support reducing immigration than such voters in general.

These findings are broadly confirmed by the results of multivariate statistical modelling. It seems unlikely that many of those who voted to leave the EU did so because of a belief that Brexit would be beneficial for those on low incomes. Meanwhile, low-income voters themselves were divided over Brexit by age and educational background in much the same way as voters in general.

1 Introduction

This report examines the public's expectations of what Brexit might bring for the economy, public services and immigration. It focuses on the views of those with low incomes, and on the perceived impact of Brexit on those with low incomes. The evidence comes from 15 questions included in the 2017 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey on behalf of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

While many opinion polls have asked voters what they think the more immediate impact of Brexit would be, few have asked voters what they think the longer-term impact would be, for example a decade after the UK has left. Yet it is arguably the perceived long-term consequence that matters more if we are to understand voters' hopes and fears about what Brexit might bring. Thus, respondents were asked their views on what the impact of Brexit would be in 10 years' time, and we compared the answers with those to other questions about Brexit that did not present respondents with such a timeframe. Meanwhile, very little research has been done into what people think the implications of Brexit might be for those on low incomes, even though they might be thought least able to withstand any adverse consequences.

However, questions that ask people what they think the material consequences of Brexit might be are on their own inadequate if we are to get a comprehensive understanding of the public's expectations of Brexit. One of the central claims of the Leave campaign was that leaving the EU would enable the UK 'to take back control' of its destiny. This cry addresses a more subjective element in the debate about the EU – that is, the extent to which the UK should or should not be willing to pool its sovereignty with the rest of the EU. As well as asking people what they thought the material consequences of Brexit would be, we also asked them whether they thought Brexit would ensure Britain had more control over various aspects of life in the country.

The cry 'take back control' was, perhaps, most often heard during the referendum campaign in reference to Britain's borders. Leaving the EU was presented as a way of controlling and, by implication at least, reducing immigration. Our questions thus also looked at attitudes towards immigration and at how important a priority reducing immigration was now for voters.

Data

The 2017 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey was conducted between July and November 2017. Overall, a random probability sample of 3,988 respondents were interviewed, representing a response rate of between 45.4% and 46.1%.¹ The bulk of the questionnaire was asked face-to-face using computer-assisted interviewing, but some questions were on a paper and pencil self-completion questionnaire that was also answered by most respondents. Four different versions of the BSA questionnaire were administered; the questions analysed here were included on three of those versions which between them were answered by 2,975 respondents. The data has been weighted to take account of known differences in the probability of being selected for interview and for known differences between the demographic profile of those who were successfully interviewed and the profile of Britain's adult population.

In addition to the questions about perceptions of Brexit, the 2017 BSA also asked detailed questions about respondent's and spouse/partner's sources of income, their housing costs and the number of adults and children living in the household. From this information, we could estimate each respondent's household income after tax and housing costs and then adjust (or 'equalise') it to take into account the composition of the household. In line with longstanding standard practice², those on low incomes are defined as those whose equalised income is less than 60% of the median income.

Structure

We begin by looking at the hopes and expectations that the public as a whole had of Brexit. We then consider how far those who voted Remain and Leave and those in different demographic groups express different views. Then we turn to the attitudes of those on low incomes, looking not only at how distinctive their attitudes are but also at the differences of outlook among them. We then draw our


analysis together by using statistical analysis to identify the most important sources of variation in attitudes towards Brexit.

2 Expectations and preferences

Material consequences

We asked respondents what they thought the consequences of Brexit would be for four key aspects of life in Britain in 10 years' time – the economy, unemployment, immigration and the NHS.³ In each case the consequences had been hotly debated during the referendum campaign.

Figure 1: Expectations of the long-term impact of Brexit




Base: all respondents

Note: Those saying that immigration or unemployment would be lower are classified as thinking that these would get better, whereas those who say immigration or unemployment would be higher are regarded as thinking these would get worse.

Voters appeared to be evenly divided in their views about what the long-term consequences of Brexit would be for the economy and for the NHS. In both cases, more or less the same proportion said that Brexit would be beneficial in the long term as thought it would be damaging. Opinion was evenly divided about the implications for the economy as a whole despite the fact that more people (31%) felt that unemployment would be higher than believed it would be lower (19%). However, the single most widely expected change was that immigration would fall, although even in this instance less than half (46%) thought that this is what would happen. There was evidently relatively little consensus among voters about what Brexit would bring.

Figure 2: Expectations of the short-term impact of Brexit



Base: all respondents


Other questions asked on the BSA survey showed that there was also very little agreement if voters were simply asked what they thought the consequences of Brexit would be without being invited specifically to think 10 years ahead (Curtice and Tipping, 2018) (see Figure 1).⁴ Asked in that way, more thought that immigration would fall, but at 54%, the figure is still not much more than half. Meanwhile, expectations of the short-term impact of Brexit on unemployment were little different from perceptions of its long-term consequences.

However, differences in timeframe seemed to affect perceptions of what Brexit would mean for the economy. Whereas opinion was evenly divided on what the long-term impact of Brexit would be, voters were on balance decidedly pessimistic about the more immediate consequences. When no timeframe was specified in the question, 45% said that the economy would get worse, well above the 33% who took that view when invited to consider the position in 10 years. It would seem that some voters thought that Brexit would do some damage to the economy in the short term but that this would be reversed over the longer term.

Control

Perhaps one reason why voters were not necessarily unduly pessimistic about the longer-term implications of Brexit for the economy is that they felt it would give the country greater control over its financial future. Certainly, well over half (57%) thought that it would result in the country having greater control over its economy (Figure 3).⁵ However, in other areas it seems that the claim that Brexit would give Britain greater control over its future had less resonance. In the case of both unemployment and the NHS only around one in three believed Britain would gain greater control, with around half taking the view that it would not make much difference.


Figure 3: Perceived impact of Brexit on control of the economy, unemployment and the NHS



Base: all respondents


Similarly, voters were relatively pessimistic about the implications of Brexit for those on a low income, even when asked to think about the position in 10 years' time (Figures 4 and 5).⁶ Slightly more respondents (28%) thought it would be easier for people to find better-paid work than thought it would be harder (24%). However, only around one in five (19%) believed that there would be fewer people living on a low income or thought that life would be easier for those on low incomes. In both cases, almost a third took the opposite view. Although the most common expectation was that Brexit would not make much difference either way, leaving the EU was certainly not widely seen as something which would benefit those on low incomes.

Figure 4: Expectations of Brexit on the lives of those on low incomes and the availability of better-paid work



Base: all respondents

Figure 5: Expectations of Brexit on the number of people on low incomes




Base: all respondents

Immigration - a priority for all?

To what extent was the rhetoric about taking back control that was used by the Leave side in the referendum campaign reflected in voters' attitudes towards immigration? We asked whether immigration should be increased, reduced or stay the same after Britain has left the EU.⁷ Over half (53%) said that there should at least be some reduction in immigration, while 40% indicated that it should remain the same as now and just 5% stated that it should be reduced. There was evidently considerable public support for a more restrictive immigration regime, but it is, in truth, an issue on which voters are divided.

Indeed, although reducing immigration was regarded as a relatively high priority for the government after Britain leaves the EU, it was far from being voters' top priority. This became clear when we presented respondents with a list of possible policy objectives the government might pursue and asked them which would be their first priority (Figure 6).

Figure 6: People's top political priority post-Brexit




Base: all respondents

Note: This figure refers to people's single most important political priority post-Brexit.

Less than a fifth (18%) cite reducing immigration as their first priority, well short of the 42% who name improving public services as the top priority. In fact, only around a third (36%) of respondents considered cutting immigration as one of their top three priorities post-Brexit, making it the fourth most popular choice behind improving public services, creating more jobs and reducing the numbers on a low income (Figure 7). Therefore, while a significant section of the public was hoping that Brexit would bring about a reduction in the level of immigration, this was not necessarily a priority for a majority of voters.

Figure 7: People's top three political priorities post-Brexit



Base: all respondents

Note: This figure represents the proportion of respondents naming the above items as one of their top three political priorities.


Summary

Voters were evenly divided about the longer-term implications of Brexit for Britain's economy while a majority anticipated that it would give the country greater control over its financial future. Nevertheless, this does not translate into optimism about the prospects for those on low incomes: few voters thought that Brexit would bring about an improvement in their lives, contrary to what many would like to see happen. Meanwhile, although around a half hoped and expected that immigration would fall, the other half did not and the issue was not necessarily a high priority for voters. There was, in truth, relatively little agreement about what Brexit would bring.

3 The Remain/Leave divide

Not least of the possible reasons why voters often appeared divided about what Brexit would bring is because Remain and Leave voters, each of them representing around a half of all voters, had come to very different conclusions about what the consequences would be. This proves above all to be the case when it comes to perceptions of the long-term impact of Brexit on the economy (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Expectations of the long-term impact of Brexit by EU referendum vote



Base: all respondents


Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Leave voters thought that the economy would be better off in 10 years' time as a result of Brexit, whereas just over 1 in 10 Remain voters (11%) took the same view. Remain supporters were also just as unlikely to think that unemployment would be lower. However, on this topic Leave voters are not particularly optimistic either. Only 31% of Leave supporters thought that unemployment would be lower – most (45%) simply thought it would not make much difference either way. It is this relative pessimism about unemployment among Leave voters that helps explain why, overall, voters were more doubtful about the long-term implications of Brexit for unemployment than they were for the economy in general (see Figure 1).

Meanwhile, around half of Leave voters thought that the NHS would be better off, while only around one in eight Remain voters took that view. Given the prominence of the claim during the referendum campaign that the NHS could be £350 million pounds a week better off as a result of Brexit, it might have been anticipated that even more Leave voters would have felt that the NHS would be better off in the long term.

The differences between the expectations of Remain and Leave voters are noticeably smaller when it comes to levels of immigration. Although 60% of Leave voters thought that immigration would be lower in 10 years' time, so also did 39% of Remain voters. Immigration is one topic where many Remain voters shared Leave voters' beliefs that Brexit would make a difference. The immigration debate between Remain and Leave voters was less one about what would happen as a result of Brexit and more one about the desirability and the importance of cutting immigration in the first place. Around three-quarters (77%) of Leave voters said that immigration should be reduced after Brexit, more than twice the equivalent proportion among Remain voters (35%). Furthermore, 59% of Leave voters said that reducing immigration should be one of the government's top three priorities, making it second only to improving public services among this group. In contrast, just 15% of Remain voters name it as a priority, leaving it no more than seventh equal in popularity.

The relatively sober mood among Leave voters about the consequences of Brexit for unemployment is replicated when asked about its implications for those on low incomes (Figure 9). Although half of those who voted Leave (50%) believed it would be easier for people in Britain to find paid work, only around one in three Leave voters felt that there would be fewer people on low incomes (32%) or that life for people on a low income would be easier (36%).


Figure 9: Optimism about the long-term impact of Brexit on those on low incomes by EU referendum vote



Base: all respondents

The contrast between the views of Remain and Leave voters on this subject becomes even more apparent if we compare the proportion of the two groups who were actually pessimistic about the implications of Brexit for low-income voters (see Figure 10). For example, 51% of Remain voters felt that life for those on low incomes would actually be harder, whereas just 11% of Leave voters held that view.


Figure 10: Pessimism about the long-term impact of Brexit on those on low incomes by EU referendum vote



Base: all respondents

Unsurprisingly, Remain and Leave voters also disagreed about the extent to which Brexit would give Britain more control over various aspects of life (Figure 11). However, the disagreement is less marked than it often is in respect of the perceived consequences of Brexit. Even among Remain voters, 44% believed that Britain would have more control over its economy. Meanwhile, no more than a half of Leave voters thought that Britain would have more control over unemployment and the NHS, a view with which around one-fifth of Remain voters concurred.

Figure 11: Perceived impact of Brexit on control of the economy, unemployment and the NHS by EU referendum vote



Base: all respondents

Summary

For the most part, Remain and Leave voters tended to view Brexit rather differently. This is especially true of its implications for the country’s economy and the importance of cutting immigration after the UK has left the EU. However, the differences between them should not be exaggerated. On most of our measures no more than approximately half of Leave voters thought that Brexit would actually be


beneficial. Sometimes – including not least in respect of the consequences for those on low incomes – only around a third of them took that view. Views about Brexit are not always as polarised as perhaps they seem.

4 Demographic differences

Previous research has established that there were substantial differences in the socio-economic background of Remain and Leave supporters (Clarke et al, 2017; Curtice, 2017). Above all, younger voters and university graduates voted heavily for Remain, while older voters and those with few, if any, educational qualifications mostly backed Leave. Given the differences between Remain and Leave voters in how they view post-Brexit Britain, we might anticipate that there are some marked differences between younger and older voters, and between graduates and those with few qualifications, in how they view the implications of Brexit.


There are some differences by age and educational background (see Figures 12 and 13), but few that are stark. For the most part they are only clearly in evidence on the economy and immigration; that is, on the issues that most divide Remain and Leave voters (Chapter 3).

Figure 12: Attitudes towards Brexit by age group



Base: all respondents

Figure 13: Attitudes towards Brexit by educational background



Base: all respondents


Older voters and those with fewer educational qualifications were more likely to say that the economy would be better off as a result of Brexit, although the differences in Figures 12 and 13 are only of the order of 20 points or so. Further analysis shows that older voters were also a little more likely to think that Britain would have greater control over its economy, but again the differences are no more than modest – 62% of those aged 46 and over thought Brexit would have that effect compared with 51% of those aged 45 or under – while there was very little difference of view between graduates and non-graduates on this question. However, these two educational groups do differ when it comes to the expected performance of the NHS and unemployment. For example, only 20% of those with a degree thought that Brexit would give Britain greater control over the performance of the NHS, compared with 43% of those without any qualifications.

The differences of outlook between younger and older voters in respect of reducing immigration were similar to those for the economy, that is around 20 points. The same was true of the difference between those with different levels of educational qualifications. We get a similar picture if we look also at attitudes towards whether cutting immigration should be a government priority. Just 33% of those with a higher education qualification suggested it should be one of the government's top three priorities, compared with 56% of those without any qualifications. Similarly, only 29% of those aged 45 or under suggested that cutting immigration was a priority, compared with 41% of those aged 46 or over. However, these differences of outlook did not extend to the perceived likelihood that immigration would fall, on which there were very few differences in the balance of opinion.

But what of attitudes towards people on low incomes? Older voters and those with few, if any, qualifications were slightly more likely to take an optimistic view but the differences are modest. For example, those without any qualifications were just 13 points more likely than graduates to say that life for people on low incomes would be easier after Brexit (see Figure 13). Differences in respect of whether there would be more or fewer people on low incomes were even more modest (see also Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix 1). For example, those whose highest qualification is O level or below (23%) were just seven points more likely than those who at least have an A level (17%) to say that there would be fewer people on a low income. However there is rather more difference in the level of pessimism about the ability to find well-paid work after Brexit. Younger people (28% of those aged 18–35) and graduates (38%) were more likely than older people (20% of those aged 56 and over) and those with no qualifications (18%) to say that it would be harder to find such work. However, apart from these examples, what is striking is that there are so few noticeable differences by age and education, or, indeed, by any other demographic category.

As we might anticipate, given the differences of outlook by educational background, there were mostly only modest differences by social class (see Figure 14). Meanwhile the balance of opinion among men and women was typically much the same, although women are often rather more likely to say that Brexit would not make much difference. However, even taking that into account men were somewhat more likely to express optimism about the implications of Brexit for the economy (men 37%; women 27%) and the NHS (men 33%; women 26%) than women.

Figure 14: Attitudes towards Brexit by social class



Base: all respondents

Summary

Chapter 3 showed that the differences between the views of Remain and Leave voters about the consequences of Brexit were often relatively modest. In this chapter, it emerges that the balance of opinion on the consequences of Brexit did not vary substantially from one demographic group to another, including on the implications of leaving the EU for those on low incomes. Only on the issues of the economy and immigration, on which we have seen Remain and Leave voters were most polarised, do any noticeable demographic differences emerge, with younger voters and graduates inclined towards a more pessimistic view of what Brexit would bring.


5 What do people on low incomes think?

This still leaves the question of what expectations people on low incomes (as defined at the beginning of this report) had of Brexit and whether their outlook is in any way different to that of other voters. Are the limited demographic differences that we have seen so far replicated when we look at people's income, or are the views of those on low incomes, nevertheless, distinctive?

Material consequences

The expectations of Brexit held by people on low incomes are in fact much the same as those of other voters. For example, as Figure 15 shows, 31% of people on low incomes thought that the economy would be better in 10 years' time thanks to Brexit, which is almost exactly the same as for those not on a low income (32%). Only in respect of immigration was there anything approaching a difference; while 48% of those not on a low income think thought immigration would fall, only 43% of those on a low income took that view.


Figure 15: Expectations of the consequences of Brexit by income



Base: all respondents

Meanwhile, people on low incomes appeared to be no more – but equally not markedly less – optimistic about the impact of Brexit on the prospects of those on low incomes or of those looking for better paid work (Figure 16). For example, just 17% of people on low incomes thought that life for those on a low income would be easier in 10 years' time, a figure that is not significantly different from the 20% of those who are not on a low income who express that view.

Figure 16: Expectations of the consequences of Brexit for those on low incomes by income




Base: all respondents

Control

However, people on a low income did have distinct expectations of the level of control Britain would have over the level of unemployment and the performance of the NHS after leaving the EU (Figure 17). In both cases, those on low incomes were between seven and eight points more likely to say that Brexit would bring about greater control than their higher income counterparts. That said, the proportion of people on low incomes who thought that Brexit would bring about greater control of the NHS and unemployment was still well below the proportion who thought it would result in greater control of the economy (56%), although in this case the expectations of those on a low income are no different from those on a higher income.

Figure 17: Perceived impact of Brexit on control of the economy, unemployment and the NHS by income




Base: all respondents

Immigration- a priority for low-income voters?

It is sometimes argued – though also disputed – that the relatively high levels of net immigration that the UK has experienced in recent years have served to depress wage rates for those at the bottom of the income scale (Ruhs and Vargas-Silva, 2017). We thus might anticipate that those on low incomes would be keener to see immigration reduced. Our evidence, however, provides little support for this proposition.

True, those on low incomes were slightly more likely than those not on a low income to say that cutting immigration should be one of the government’s top three priorities (Figure 18). However, at four points the difference is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, those on a low income (50%) were slightly less likely than other voters (55%) to say that immigration should be reduced after Brexit, although at 50% there is evidently still substantial support for reducing immigration among those on low incomes.

Figure 18: People’s political priorities by income



Base: all respondents

Note: This figure represents the proportion of respondents naming the above items as one of their top three political priorities.

Cutting immigration was not the only government priority which was as popular among those on low incomes as among those who are not – overall, the priorities for government were more or less identical across the board. Although those on low incomes were seven points more likely to select ‘creating better-paid jobs’ as one of their top three priorities for government, this is counterbalanced by the fact that they are six points less likely to choose ‘reducing the number of people on low incomes’. Perhaps some voters on low incomes are more likely to be aware that they are relatively poorly paid than they are to think of themselves as belonging to a group of low-income voters.

Summary


For the most part, the balance of attitudes towards post-Brexit Britain among low-income voters was very similar to that among voters in general, including on the implications of leaving the EU for those on low incomes themselves. They shared with their fellow citizens a relatively widespread expectation that immigration would fall, although its reduction is by no means their highest priority. They had in common a relatively cautious attitude towards some of the other consequences of Brexit, including not least for the economy. The one area where their views were somewhat distinctive is that they were more likely than other voters to believe that Brexit would result in greater control over the level of unemployment and the performance of the NHS. It seems that, as we have seen is true of voters in general, there was little agreement among low-income voters about what Brexit would bring.

6 Divisions among low-income voters?

Although the expectations that low-income voters had of Brexit were for the most part very similar to those of voters in general, low-income voters were far from being typical of society demographically. In particular, they are both younger and are less likely to be graduates. But if we look at the demographic differences among younger voters themselves, will we find that their age and education makes a difference to their views, just as it does among voters in general? Moreover, once we take into account the demographic characteristics of low-income voters might we discover that their views are in fact somewhat distinctive? In this chapter we examine the first of these possibilities, while the second is considered in Chapter 7.


Figure 19 compares the views of younger voters on low incomes with those of older voters on low incomes, while Figure 20 breaks down the views of those on a low income by educational background. The two figures show that the differences of view by age and education already observed among the general population were also in evidence among those on a low income. Older voters on low incomes were somewhat more likely to think that the economy would better off as a result of Brexit and that immigration should be lower. Indeed, the differences between younger and older low-income voters in Figure 19 are similar to the equivalent differences between younger and older voters in general (see Figure 12). At the same time, those who have some experience of higher education were less likely to say that the economy would be better off and that immigration should be cut. However, here the differences are somewhat smaller than they were among voters in general (compare Figure 20 with Figure 13). This is because low-income voters with few, if any, educational qualifications were less likely than low-income voters in general to be optimistic about the economic consequences of Brexit or to say that immigration should be lower. It seems that this very specific group of people on low incomes does have a slightly different outlook on Brexit.⁸

Figure 19: Attitudes towards Brexit among people on low incomes by age group



Base: respondents on low incomes

Figure 20: Attitudes towards Brexit among people on low incomes by educational background




Base: respondents on low incomes

Similar patterns are also evident in the level of optimism expressed about what Brexit would mean for those on low incomes. Older, low-income voters were a little more likely than younger ones to think that life on a low income would be easier after Brexit, but as in the case of all voters the difference is small. Meanwhile, in contrast to the position among all voters, those with the lowest educational qualifications were not more likely to say that life would be easier.


However in Chapter 4 we observed that among voters in general there were greater demographic differences in the level of actual pessimism expressed about the implications of Brexit for people on a low income, and this was also apparent among low-income voters themselves. In particular, the relative pessimism of graduates in respect of the number of people who will be on a low income after Brexit is also apparent among low-income voters with a higher educational qualification. As Figure 21 shows, 45% of this group thought that there would be more people on a low income in 10 years' time, compared with 28% of those whose highest qualification is a CSE or equivalent. Equally, both younger low-income voters and those with a higher education qualification were more likely to think that it would be harder to find paid work (see Figures 21 and 22). Thus, 30% of low-income voters aged 35 or under and 39% of those with a higher education qualification thought that it would be harder to find paid work, compared with 19% of those aged 56 or over and 19% of those whose highest educational qualification is a CSE or its equivalent.

Figure 21: Attitudes towards Brexit among people on low incomes by educational background



Base: respondents on low incomes

Figure 22: Pessimism among people on a low income about the impact of Brexit on people on a low income by age



Base: respondents on low incomes

Summary

As in the case of all voters, there were modest and limited demographic differences in opinions about Brexit among low-income voters. Younger such voters and those with a higher level of education were less likely to be optimistic about the economic consequences of Brexit, and less likely to want to see the level of immigration reduced. They were also more likely to be pessimistic about the consequences of Brexit for low-income voters such as themselves. Indeed, for the most part, the views of low-income voters from any particular demographic group were typically similar to those of all voters in that group. The only exception of any note to that general observation is that less educationally well-qualified low-

income voters did not seem to exhibit entirely the same level of optimism about the economic consequences of Brexit or support for reducing immigration as was evident among all educationally less well qualified voters.

7 What matters?

So far, our analysis has suggested that, for the most part, those on low incomes do not have particularly distinctive views about Brexit. There were just two apparent exceptions to that generalisation – those on low incomes emerged as more likely to think that Brexit would result in Britain having more control over (i) unemployment, and (ii) the performance of the NHS. However, so far our analysis has failed to take account of the ways in which those on low incomes are demographically distinctive. They are, for example, less likely to be engaged in a professional or managerial occupation and more likely to be someone whose highest educational qualification is CSE level or below. Might the views of those on a low income emerge as somewhat different once these background characteristics have been taken into account? Equally, however, might it transpire that, once we take these differences into account, the attitudes of those on a low income towards Brexit giving Britain greater control over unemployment and the NHS are not so distinctive after all?

To assess these possibilities, we have used a statistical technique known as logistic regression analysis. This technique enables us to estimate the extent to which being someone on a low income makes a difference to the probability that someone holds a particular view while taking into account (or ‘controlling for’) the ‘impact’ on a person’s attitude of all the other demographic characteristics they have. In particular, we take into account gender, age, educational qualifications, and social class. As a further check, we ran our models both taking into account whether someone voted in the EU referendum and ignoring that variable?

This approach has been applied to all the questions about Brexit analysed in this report. As required by logistic regression each attitude has been turned into a binary variable. Thus, in the case of the perceived impact of Brexit on the economy, for example, those who thought it would be better off in 10 years’ time as a result of leaving the EU are distinguished from those who thought it would be worse off or that Brexit would not make any difference, with those saying it would be better off coded as ‘1’ and the remainder, ‘0’. Meanwhile, in the case of each of the demographic variables one category is defined as the reference category. The regression then shows for every other category the ‘impact’ of being in that demographic group (controlling for all the other variables) compared with the reference category. A ‘+’ sign means that someone in that category is significantly more likely than someone in the reference category to express the attitude that has been coded 1, while a ‘-’ sign indicates that they are less likely to do so.

Table 1 summarises the results of analysing in this way whether people thought Britain’s economy would be better or worse off in 10 years’ time. Those categories where the balance of attitudes is statistically significantly different from that in the reference category are shown in red. Thus, for example, we can see that women were less likely than men to say that the economy would be better off, whereas those who voted in the referendum are more likely to think that the economy would be better off than those who did not vote. (Readers who are interested in further details can find the full results of our regression analyses in Appendix 1.)

Table 1: Summary of regression analysis of views on whether Britain’s economy would be better in 10 years’ time as a result of Brexit

Category	Reference category	Regression model without taking into account whether respondents voted	Regression model taking into account whether respondents voted
Gender	Male	Female (-)	Female (-)
Age	Age 66 years and above	18–25 years (-)	18–25 years (-)
		26–35 years (-)	26–35 years (-)
		36–45 years (-)	36–45 years
		46–55 years	46–55 years
		56–65 years (-)	56–65 years (-)
Highest education qualification	Degree	Higher education below degree (+)	Higher education below degree (+)
		A level or equivalent (+)	A level or equivalent (+)
		O level or equivalent (+)	O level or equivalent (+)
		CSE or equivalent (+)	CSE or equivalent (+)
		Foreign or other qualification	Foreign or other qualification
		No qualification (+)	No qualification (+)
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	Intermediate occupations	Intermediate occupations
		Employers in small organisations; own account workers	Employers in small organisations; own account workers
		Lower supervisory and technical occupations	Lower supervisory and technical occupations
		Semi-routine and routine occupations	Semi-routine and routine occupations
Income	Lowest income quartile	Second -lowest income quartile	Second-lowest income quartile
		Second income quartile	Second income quartile
		Highest income quartile	Highest income quartile
Voted in referendum	No		Yes (+)

Note: (-) significantly less likely than the reference category to think that the economy would be better; (+) significantly more likely than the reference category to think that the economy would be better.

Two points stand out in Table 1. First, there is a strong age effect. Those aged 65 or below were less likely to think that the economy would be better off in 10 years’ time than those aged 66 or over. The difference is particularly marked among the two youngest age groups. Second, those who are not graduates were more likely than graduates to think that the economy would be better off. These findings represent clear confirmation of the earlier finding that age and education are related to people’s expectations of the economic consequences of Brexit regardless of whether or not they voted.

Also confirmed, however, is our earlier finding that whether someone is on a low income or not does not make any significant difference to their chances of expressing optimism or pessimism about the economy after Brexit. Once we take into account their other demographic characteristics, the views of those on low incomes are much the same as those of any other group of voters.

Table 2: Summary of regression analysis of attitudes towards whether immigration should be reduced after Brexit

Category	Reference category	Regression model without taking into account whether respondents voted	Regression model taking into account whether respondents voted
Gender	Male	Female	Female
Age	Age 66 years and above	18–25 years (-)	18–25 years (-)
		26–35 years (-)	26–35 years (-)
		36–45 years	36–45 years
		46–55 years	46–55 years
		56–65 years	56–65 years
Highest education qualification	Degree	Higher education below degree	Higher education below degree
		A level or equivalent (+)	A level or equivalent (+)
		O level or equivalent (+)	O level or equivalent (+)
		CSE or equivalent	CSE or equivalent
		Foreign or other qualification	Foreign or other qualification
		No qualification (+)	No qualification (+)
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	Intermediate occupations	Intermediate occupations
		Employers in small organisations; own account workers	Employers in small organisations; own account workers
		Lower supervisory and technical occupations	Lower supervisory and technical occupations
		Semi-routine and routine occupations	Semi-routine and routine occupations
Income	Lowest income quartile	Second-lowest income quartile (+)	Second-lowest income quartile (+)
		Second income quartile	Second income quartile
		Highest income quartile	Highest income quartile
Voted in referendum	No	-	Yes

Note: (-) significantly less likely than the reference category to say that immigration should be reduced; (+) significantly more likely than the reference category to say that immigration should be reduced.

Age and education also emerge as important when we look at whether or not people think that immigration should be reduced after Brexit (see Table 2). Those in the youngest age groups are significantly less likely than those aged 66 or over to say that immigration should be reduced. Conversely,

those with fewer educational qualifications, particularly no qualifications, are more likely than graduates to say that immigration should be reduced. Meanwhile, there is only a weak relationship between income and immigration; those in the second-lowest income quartile are significantly more likely than those on the lowest incomes to want to cut immigration, but otherwise there are no statistically significant differences.

But what about expectations of the impact of Brexit on the lives of those on low incomes (see Table 3)? Here, our previous finding that age does not make much difference is confirmed. Education, in contrast, does matter. Non-graduates were all less likely than graduates to say that life would be harder for people on low incomes. Meanwhile, our results confirm that the attitudes of those on low incomes were not all distinctive on this topic.

Table 3: Summary of regression analysis of views on whether the lives of those on low incomes would be harder post Brexit

Category	Reference category	Regression model without taking into account whether respondents voted	Regression model taking into account whether respondents voted
Gender	Male	Female	Female
Age	Age 66 years and above	18–25 years	18–25 years
		26–35 years	26–35 years
		36–45 years	36–45 years
		46–55 years	46–55 years
		56–65 years	56–65 years
Highest education qualification	Degree	Higher education below degree (-)	Higher education below degree
		A level or equivalent (-)	A level or equivalent (-)
		O level or equivalent (-)	O level or equivalent (-)
		CSE or equivalent (-)	CSE or equivalent (-)
		Foreign or other qualification	Foreign or other qualification
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	Intermediate occupations (-)	Intermediate occupations (-)
		Employers in small organisations; own account workers	Employers in small organisations; own account workers
		Lower supervisory and technical occupations	Lower supervisory and technical occupations
		Semi-routine and routine occupations	Semi-routine and routine occupations
		No qualification (-)	No qualification (-)
Income	Lowest income quartile	Second-lowest income quartile	Second-lowest income quartile
		Second income quartile	Second income quartile
		Highest income quartile	Highest income quartile
Whether voted in referendum	No		Yes

Note: (-) significantly less likely than the reference category to say lives would be harder; (+) significantly more likely than the reference category to say lives would be harder.

Indeed, if we look at the results of our modelling more generally, there is no evidence that the views of those on low incomes are significantly different from those of other voters – except on the two subjects identified earlier: control of unemployment and the NHS.

Table 4 shows the results of our analysis of control of the NHS. Here educational background makes a difference. Those with lower level qualifications were significantly more likely than graduates to say that Brexit would result in more control of the performance of the NHS. However, at the same time, those on

the highest incomes were less likely than those on the lowest incomes to express that view. That said, the views of those in the two middle income quartiles were not significantly different from those on the lowest incomes, so it is the views of those on the highest incomes, rather than the opinion of those on the lowest incomes, that are distinctive on this subject.

Table 4: Summary of regression analysis of attitudes towards whether Brexit would result in more control of the NHS

Category	Reference category	Regression model without taking into account whether respondents voted	Regression model taking into account whether respondents voted
Gender	Male	Female	Female
Age	Age 66 years and above	18–25 years	18–25 years
		26–35 years	26–35 years
		36–45 years	36–45 years
		46–55 years	46–55 years
		56–65 years	56–65 years
Highest education qualification	Degree	Higher education below degree	Higher education below degree
		A level or equivalent (+)	A level or equivalent (+)
		O level or equivalent (+)	O level or equivalent (+)
		CSE or equivalent (+)	CSE or equivalent
		Foreign or other qualification	Foreign or other qualification
		No qualification (+)	No qualification (+)
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	Intermediate occupations	Intermediate occupations
		Employers in small organisations; own account workers	Employers in small organisations; own account workers
		Lower supervisory and technical occupations	Lower supervisory and technical occupations
		Semi-routine and routine occupations	Semi-routine and routine occupations
Income	Lowest income quartile	Second-lowest income quartile	Second-lowest income quartile
		Second income quartile	Second income quartile
		Highest income quartile (-)	Highest income quartile (-)
Voted in referendum	No	-	Yes

Note: (-) significantly less likely than the reference category to say that Britain would have more control over the NHS; (+) significantly more likely than the reference category to say that Britain would have more control over the NHS.

Finally, in Table 5, we analyse the link between demographic position and expectations of the impact that Brexit would have on the control of unemployment. Here both age and education matter a little, though not as much as they do in some other instances. Those in the youngest age groups were slightly less

likely than those aged 66 and over to think that Britain would have more control over unemployment, while there was also some tendency for those with lower educational qualifications to be more likely than graduates to express that view.

Table 5: Summary of regression analysis of attitudes towards whether Brexit would result in more control of unemployment

Category	Reference category	Regression model without taking into account whether respondents voted	Regression model taking into account whether respondents voted
Gender	Male	Female	Female
Age	Age 66 years and above	18–25 years (-)	18–25 years (-)
		26–35 years (-)	26–35 years (-)
		36–45 years	36–45 years
		46–55 years	46–55 years
		56–65 years	56–65 years
Highest education qualification	Degree	Higher education below degree	Higher education below degree
		A level or equivalent (+)	A level or equivalent (+)
		O level or equivalent (+)	O level or equivalent (+)
		CSE or equivalent	CSE or equivalent
		Foreign or other qualification	Foreign or other qualification
		No qualification (+)	No qualification (+)
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	Intermediate occupations	Intermediate occupations
		Employers in small organisations; own account workers (+)	Employers in small organisations; own account workers (+)
		Lower supervisory and technical occupations	Lower supervisory and technical occupations
		Semi-routine and routine occupations	Semi-routine and routine occupations
Income	Lowest income quartile	Second-lowest income quartile (-)	Second-lowest income quartile
		Second income quartile (-)	Second income quartile (-)
		Highest income quartile (-)	Highest income quartile (-)
Voted in referendum	No	-	Yes

Note: (-) significantly less likely than the reference category to say that Britain would have more control over unemployment; (+) significantly more likely than the reference category to say that Britain would have more control over unemployment.

However, it is on this topic above all where the views of those on the lowest incomes stand out. Even those in the second lowest income group were less likely than those on the lowest incomes to say that Britain would have more control over unemployment (though the difference is not quite significant once

we control for whether someone voted in the referendum), while the difference of outlook between those on the lowest incomes and those on the highest is even greater. Here is one subject where income clearly does appear to make a difference to voters' perspective.

Summary

Undertaking a logistic regression analysis of the relationship between people's demographic background and their attitudes towards Brexit confirms that, for the most part, the views of those on low incomes are not particularly distinctive. The one clear exception is that those on the lowest incomes were more likely to think that Brexit would result in greater control over unemployment. Otherwise, however, the attitudes of those on low incomes are more or less the same as those of other voters.

8 Conclusion

This report has focused on three aspects of public attitudes towards the implications of Brexit which have largely been neglected. First, we tested the extent to which the Leave side's argument that voters should try to 'take back control' had resonance for voters across a number of areas of public policy. Second, we focused on voters' perceptions of the long-term consequences of Brexit rather than their impressions of what the more immediate consequences might be. Third, we ascertained what voters thought the implications of Brexit would be for those on low incomes. In each case we have paid particular attention to the perceived implications for those on low incomes. Meanwhile, given the prominence of the issue in the referendum campaign, we have also looked at what voters would like to happen to immigration once the UK has left the EU.

Voters were relatively optimistic about the longer-term consequences of Brexit for the economy in general. While there was some concern about its possible impact on unemployment, many felt that there would be a long-term gain as there was a widespread feeling that Brexit would enable Britain to have greater control over its economy. Meanwhile, nearly half of voters anticipated that Brexit would result in a long-term reduction in the level of immigration, a development that a similar proportion would welcome, albeit that they do not necessarily regard it as the most important priority for government action.

But this mood did not extend to the implications of Brexit for those on low incomes. Although slightly more felt that it would be easier to find well-paid jobs after Brexit, pessimists outnumbered optimists when it came to the perceived impact of Brexit for the lives and the numbers of people on a low income, while many simply thought it would not make much difference anyway. However, it seems that the implications of Brexit for those on low incomes were not at the forefront of voters' minds in the referendum. Even among Leave voters only around a third thought that Brexit would prove beneficial for those on low incomes, and the difference between the views of Remain and Leave voters on this subject were smaller than on many other issues, including most notably the implications of Brexit for the economy and what should happen to the level of immigration after Brexit. It is on these issues too – rather than the implications of Brexit for those on low incomes – that the demographic divisions by age and education that underlie the outcome of the EU referendum – are primarily in evidence.

Much of this picture also applies to the attitudes of those on low incomes themselves. They too, were relatively optimistic about the long-term implications of Brexit for the economy, despite concerns about unemployment. They also hoped and expected that immigration would fall, although this was not necessarily their top priority. At the same time those on low incomes largely shared other voters' scepticism that Brexit would prove beneficial to them in particular, while their attitudes reflected their age and educational background in much the same way that it did voters in general. There is just one issue where the attitudes of low income voters truly stood out from those in all other income groups – they were more likely to think that Brexit would give Britain greater control over the level of unemployment, though even in this case only a minority of low-income voters held that view. But for the most part the debate about Brexit was one that divided low-income voters in much the same way as the rest of the country. And doubtless like everyone else now that the Brexit negotiations have entered their critical phase, they are wondering what indeed it will eventually deliver.

Notes

1. www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39256/bsa35_technical-details.pdf
2. www.gov.uk/government/statistics/households-below-average-income-199495-to-201516
3. The questions were:
 - Do you think that as a result of leaving the EU, immigration to Britain will be higher in 10 years' time, lower, or won't it make much difference?
 - Do you think that as a result of leaving the EU, the NHS will be better in 10 years' time, worse, or won't it make much difference?
 - Do you think that as a result of leaving the EU, unemployment in Britain will be higher in 10 years' time, lower, or won't it make much difference?
 - Do you think that as a result of leaving the EU, Britain's economy will be better off in 10 years' time, worse off, or won't it make much difference?
4. The questions were:
 - From what you have seen and heard so far, do you think that as a result of leaving the EU Britain's economy will be better off, worse off, or won't it make much difference?
 - And from what you have seen and heard so far, do you think that as a result of leaving the EU unemployment in Britain will be higher, lower, or won't it make much difference?
 - (From what you have seen and heard so far), do you think that as a result of leaving the EU immigration to Britain will be higher, lower, or won't it make much difference?
5. The questions were:
 - As a result of leaving the EU will Britain have more control over Britain's economy, less control, or won't it make much difference?
 - As a result of leaving the EU will Britain have more control over the level of unemployment, less control, or won't it make much difference?
 - As a result of leaving the EU will Britain have more control over how well the NHS performs, less control, or won't it make much difference?
6. The questions were:
 - Do you think that as a result of leaving the EU, it will be easier for people in Britain to find better paid work in 10 years' time, harder, or won't it make much difference?
 - Do you think that as a result of leaving the EU, there will be more people living on low incomes in 10 years' time, less people or about the same amount of people?
 - Do you think that as a result of leaving the EU, life for people on low incomes will be easier in 10 years' time, harder or won't it make much difference?
7. Once Britain has left the EU, do you think immigration into Britain should be increased, reduced, or stay at more or less the same level as now?
8. This is also evident in expectations of whether immigration will fall. Only 36% of low income voters whose highest qualification, if any, is a CSE think that immigration will fall, compared with 56% of all voters whose highest qualification is a CSE.


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Appendix 1


Figures A1 and A2 present the distribution of all our survey items on the impact of Brexit on those on low incomes by age and education.

Figure A1: Attitudes towards life for people on a low income by age



Base: all respondents

Figure A2: Views of people on a low income on life for people on low incomes by age



Base: all respondents

Logistic regression

Tables A1 to A5 present full details of the results of the logistic regression summarised in Chapter 7.

Table A1: Logistic regression of views on whether as a result of Brexit Britain's economy would be better in ten years' time

		Without taking into account vote		Taking into account vote	
		Coefficient	Standard error	Coefficient	Standard error
Gender	Male	0	.	0	.
	Female	-0.30*	0.13	-0.31*	0.13
Age	18–25	-0.93**	0.33	-0.76*	0.33
	26–35	-0.83***	0.22	-0.68**	0.23
	36–45	-0.46*	0.21	-0.34	0.21
	46–55	-0.31	0.19	-0.26	0.19
	56–65	-0.48*	0.19	-0.42*	0.2
	66 and above	0	.	0	.
Highest education	Degree	0	.	0	.
	Higher education below degree	0.45*	0.22	0.47*	0.22
	A level or equivalent	0.51*	0.21	0.52*	0.21
	O level or equivalent	0.90***	0.21	0.91***	0.21
	CSE or equivalent	0.99***	0.27	1.06***	0.28
	Foreign or other	0.68	0.44	0.88	0.48
	No qualification	0.60*	0.24	0.67**	0.25
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	0	.	0	.
	Intermediate occupations	0.09	0.23	0.11	0.23
	Employers in small org; own account workers	-0.1	0.24	-0.1	0.24
	Lower supervisory and technical occupations	0.03	0.25	0.09	0.25
	Semi-routine and routine occupations	0.3	0.18	0.34	0.18
Income group	1 (Lowest income quartile)	0	.	0	.
	2	0.09	0.18	0.1	0.18
	3	0.13	0.19	0.11	0.2
	4 (Highest income quartile)	-0.09	0.2	-0.1	0.2
Whether voted	Yes	.	.	0.40*	0.18
	No	.	.	0	.
	Constant	-0.60*	0.26	-1.02**	0.33
	R-squared				
	N. of cases	1478		1473	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A2: Logistic regression of attitudes towards whether immigration should be reduced after Brexit

		Without taking into account vote		Taking into account vote	
		Coefficient	Standard error	Coefficient	Standard error
Gender	Male	0	.	0	.
	Female	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.11
Age	18–25	-0.59*	0.27	-0.55*	0.27
	26–35	-0.47**	0.17	-0.45*	0.18
	36–45	-0.24	0.17	-0.21	0.18
	46–55	-0.21	0.17	-0.2	0.17
	56–65	0	0.17	0.03	0.17
	66 and above	0	.	0	.
Highest education	Degree	0	.	0	.
	Higher education below degree	0.29	0.18	0.28	0.18
	A level or equivalent	0.62***	0.17	0.61***	0.17
	O level or equivalent	0.82***	0.17	0.83***	0.17
	CSE or equivalent	0.46	0.24	0.53*	0.24
	Foreign or other	-0.38	0.35	-0.48	0.37
	No qualification	0.60**	0.2	0.61**	0.21
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	0	.	0	.
	Intermediate occupations	-0.1	0.18	-0.11	0.18
	Employers in small org; own account workers	0.25	0.2	0.25	0.2
	Lower supervisory & technical occupations	0.37	0.22	0.41	0.22
	Semi-routine and routine occupations	0.21	0.16	0.18	0.16
Income group	1 (Lowest income quartile)	0	.	0	.
	2	0.46**	0.15	0.43**	0.15
	3	0.24	0.16	0.2	0.16
	4 (Highest income quartile)	-0.03	0.17	-0.06	0.17
Whether voted	Yes	.	.	0.07	0.14
	No	.	.	0	.
	Constant	-0.34	0.22	-0.38	0.27
	R-squared				
	N. of cases	1945		1929	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A3: Logistic regression of views on whether the lives of those on low incomes would be harder post Brexit

		Without taking into account vote		Taking into account vote	
		Coefficient	Standard error	Coefficient	Standard error
Gender	Male	0	.	0	.
	Female	-0.05	0.13	-0.07	0.13
Age	18–25	0.24	0.32	0.22	0.33
	26–35	0.16	0.21	0.15	0.22
	36–45	0.25	0.22	0.23	0.22
	46–55	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
	56–65	0.21	0.2	0.2	0.2
	66 and above	0	.	0	.
Highest education	Degree	0	.	0	.
	Higher education below degree	-0.53*	0.21	-0.52*	0.21
	A level or equivalent	-0.71***	0.2	-0.71***	0.2
	O level or equivalent	-1.04***	0.21	-1.04***	0.21
	CSE or equivalent	-0.92**	0.3	-0.93**	0.3
	Foreign or other	0.04	0.45	-0.09	0.49
	No qualification	-0.71**	0.25	-0.71**	0.25
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	0	.	0	.
	Intermediate occupations	-0.46*	0.22	-0.46*	0.22
	Employers in small org; own account workers	-0.18	0.25	-0.19	0.25
	Lower supervisory and technical occupations	-0.41	0.26	-0.44	0.26
	Semi-routine and routine occupations	-0.27	0.19	-0.28	0.19
Income group	1 (Lowest income quartile)	0	.	0	.
	2	-0.13	0.19	-0.13	0.19
	3	0.05	0.19	0.04	0.2
	4 (Highest income quartile)	-0.1	0.2	-0.1	0.2
Whether voted	Yes	.	.	-0.05	0.18
	No	.	.	0	.

Constant	-0.04	0.26	0.03	0.31
R-squared				
N. of cases	1466		1461	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4: Logistic regression of attitudes towards whether Brexit would result in more control of the NHS

		Without taking into account vote		Taking into account vote	
		Coefficient	Standard error	Coefficient	Standard error
Gender	Male	0	.	0	.
	Female	-0.09	0.12	-0.06	0.12
Age	18–25	0.1	0.27	0	0.27
	26–35	-0.11	0.19	-0.23	0.2
	36–45	0.01	0.19	-0.08	0.19
	46–55	0.11	0.18	0.04	0.18
	56–65	0.04	0.18	-0.03	0.18
	66 and above	0	.	0	.
Highest education	Degree	0	.	0	.
	Higher education below degree	0.39	0.21	0.39	0.21
	A level or equivalent	0.44*	0.19	0.43*	0.19
	O level or equivalent	0.68***	0.19	0.67***	0.19
	CSE or equivalent	0.52*	0.25	0.44	0.26
	Foreign or other	0.23	0.41	-0.03	0.44
	No qualification	0.79***	0.22	0.75***	0.22
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	0	.	0	.
	Intermediate occupations	0.02	0.2	0.01	0.2
	Employers in small org; own account workers	0.3	0.2	0.32	0.21
	Lower supervisory and technical occupations	0.26	0.21	0.21	0.22
	Semi-routine & routine occupations	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.17
Income group	1 (Lowest income quartile)	0	.	0	.
	2	-0.11	0.15	-0.07	0.16
	3	-0.15	0.17	-0.1	0.17

	4 (Highest income quartile)	-0.70***	0.18	-0.64***	0.18
Whether voted	Yes	.	.	-0.2	0.15
	No	.	.	0	.
	Constant	-1.01***	0.24	-0.82**	0.28
	R-squared				
	N. of cases	1915		1899	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A5: Logistic regression of attitudes towards whether Brexit would result in more control of unemployment

		Without taking into account vote		Taking into account vote	
		Coefficient	Standard error	Coefficient	Standard error
Gender	Male	0	.	0	.
	Female	-0.16	0.11	-0.15	0.12
Age	18–25	-0.68*	0.28	-0.66*	0.29
	26–35	-0.41*	0.18	-0.39*	0.19
	36–45	-0.14	0.18	-0.12	0.18
	46–55	-0.26	0.17	-0.28	0.17
	56–65	-0.23	0.17	-0.21	0.18
	66 and above	0	.	0	.
Highest education	Degree	0	.	0	.
	Higher education below degree	0.21	0.2	0.21	0.2
	A level or equivalent	0.42*	0.18	0.42*	0.18
	O level or equivalent	0.39*	0.18	0.39*	0.18
	CSE or equivalent	-0.06	0.25	-0.06	0.25
	Foreign or other	-0.02	0.41	0.14	0.42
	No qualification	0.42*	0.21	0.42*	0.21
Social class	Managerial and professional occupations	0	.	0	.
	Intermediate occupations	0.2	0.19	0.2	0.19
	Employers in small org; own account workers	0.43*	0.2	0.44*	0.2
	Lower supervisory & technical occupations	0.25	0.21	0.29	0.21
	Semi-routine and routine occupations	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.17

Income group	1 (Lowest income quartile)	0	.	0	.
	2	-0.30*	0.15	-0.27	0.15
	3	-0.50**	0.17	-0.48**	0.17
	4 (Highest income quartile)	-0.55**	0.17	-0.53**	0.17
Whether voted	Yes	.	.	0.06	0.15
	No	.	.	0	.
	Constant	-0.38	0.22	-0.45	0.27
	R-squared				
	N. of cases	1912		1897	
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					

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